Abstract--Given a square-free integer N, the group of points on an elliptic curve over the ring ZN is defined in the natural way. We prove that computing the order of points on elliptic curves over ZN is as difficult as factoring N, in the sense of randomly polynomial time reduction. Therefore, cryptosystems based on the difficulty of computing the order of points on elliptic curves over the ring ZN will be at least as robust as those based on the difficulty of factoring N. (~)
INTRODUCTION
Factorization of large integers is an extensively studied problem, due to its cryptographic applications. In fact, the security of some cryptosystems as RSA [1] is believed to lie on the difficulty of factoring a certain integer N = pq.
On the other hand, elliptic curves have become more and more used in cryptography in the last decade, directly for designing new cryptosystems [2] , as well as in the design of factorization algorithms [3] and primality tests [4, 5] .
In most cryptographic applications of elliptic curves, knowing the order of the group of points or the order of some points on the elliptic curve is required. Schoof's algorithm [6] , and its improvements [7] , are the known methods to solve this problem for elliptic curves over the field Zp. Nevertheless, the above algorithms are useless if the elliptic curve is defined over the ring ZN, where N is a composite integer.
In this letter, the definition of elliptic curve over ZN, where N is square-free, is given. We show that N can be easily factored with high probability, with an oracle providing the order of any point on such a curve. Therefore, cryptosystems based on the difficulty of computing the 0893-9659/01/$ -see front matter (~) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Typeset by .A.h~S-TEX PII: S0893-9659 (00)00159-2 order of points on elliptic curves over the ring ZN will be at least as robust as those based on the difficulty of factoring N. An elliptic curve can be seen as an additive Abelian group whose zero element is O. The k th multiple of a point P is denoted by k#P. The order of the elliptic curve, that is, the number of points on it including O, will be denoted as #Ep (a, b) and the order of a point, P, on that curve will be denoted by o(P).
ELLIPTIC CURVES
There is another equivalent definition of elliptic curve in projective coordinates
Here, the affine point (x, y) is mapped onto (x : y :1), and O is mapped onto (0 : 1 : 0). The formulas)for computing multiples and adding points, as well as more detailed information on elliptic curves can be found in [8] . EN(a, b) . Now, the order of a point P E EN(a, b), can be computed as the least common multiple of the orders of Pi = 7ri(P) in Ep~ (a, b), for i = 1,..., r, that is, o(P) = lcm(o(P1),..., o(Pr)). The factor-revealing points can be characterized in terms of ~ri as the points P such that some but not all projections ~i(P) = O.
2.2.. Elliptic Curves Modulo a
Note that the above definition for the group of points of the elliptic curve Eg(a, b) could be directly extended to any integer, N = 6N' ± 1, if the definition of elliptic curve over the ring Zq, where q is a prime power, were given.
If the factorization of N must be kept secret, only the affine points on Eg(a,b) might be considered. Since the formulas for computing multiples and adding points on Ep(a, b), p prime, are rational expressions of the coordinates, they are also valid if applied to affine points on Eg(a, b), in most cases. Namely, the formulas can compute (xl : Yl : 1) + (x2 : Y2 : 1) when Xl -x2 E Z~v or when xl = x2 and Yl ÷ Y2 E Z~. Thus, if the classical formulas fail, a nontrivial factor of N is easily obtained.
FACTORING N GIVEN AN ORACLE OF o(P)
Although any factor-revealing point (see the previous section) will reveal a nontrivial factor of N, the probability of finding a such point at random is very small when the primes p~ are large enough. In this section, we show how factor-revealing points can be found by using the oracle (9 defined as follows. EN(a, b) such that gcd(4a3 + 2762,N) = 1, and an a~ne point P = (x : y : 1) on this curve. 
OUTPUT: The order o(P) on Eg(a, b
Thus, if all si are equal, ~q(Q) ~ O for all i, and Q is an affine point. Otherwise, there exist some (but not all) i = 1,... ,r such that lri(Q) = O, that is, Q is a factor-revealing point. |
Actually, during the computation of Q, one of the additions of points involved could fail. As seen in Section 2.2, in such case, a nontrivial factor of N is also found. Since the factorization of N is unknown, it seems that there is no deterministic way to build elliptic curves and points fulfilling the conditions of Corollary 1 to obtain a nontrivial factor of N. Then, the following random algorithm is proposed.
I. Generate (x,y,a) at random, uniformly distributed on ZN × ZN X Z N . let b=y2-x 3_ax (modN). let g = gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2, N). if g--N, go to 1. else if g ~ 1, g is a nontrivial factor of N.
exit. 2. let P--(x:y:l).
Obtain o(P) from the oracle (9. if o(P) is odd, go to I.
3. Compute Q--(o(P)/2)#P, using the classical formulas.
if the computation fails, a nontrivial factor of _AT is found, exit. else if Q is an affine point, go to I. else, Q is a factor-revealing point, exit. PROOF. Since, as seen in Proposition 1, each round of the proposed algorithm obtains a nontrivial factor of N in polynomial time with a probability greater than a positive constant, then N is factorized in random polynomial time. |
CONCLUSIONS
In this letter, a definition for the group of points on an elliptic curve modulo a square-free integer N = 6N t + 1 is given. From this definition, it is shown that if N is composite, the problem of finding the order of a point on an elliptic curve modulo N is at least as difficult as factoring N. Therefore, any cryptosystem based on the difficulty of computing such orders is as robust as the well-known RSA cryptosystem, as well as any other cryptosystem based on the difficulty of the factorization problem. The results obtained here could be directly extended to the general case (i.e., nonsquare-free integers) if a definition of elliptic curve over the ring Zq, where q is a prime power, were given.
In [9] , Kunihiro and Koyama show the equivalence between counting the number of points on elliptic curves over the ring ZN and factoring N, for any square-free integer N. Although this result is related to the main result in our paper, it is not equivalent.
It is not known how to use an oracle for 4pEN(a, b) to compute the order of a given point P E  EN(a, b) . On the other hand, an oracle of the form in this paper can be used to get information on 4PEN (a, b) . Instead of using our oracle O as a "front end" for the random polynomial time reduction used in [9] , a direct reduction is given in this letter. The use of irreducible polynomials makes possible to get a lower bound of the probability of factoring N in each round of the algorithm, without any assumption about the probability distribution of 4pEp(a, b) on the Hasse interval.
APPENDIX
The aim of this Appendix is to prove Proposition 1. Let p be a prime number greater than 3. Since ~-~ < 1/2 Vi, and expression (.) bound on the 9vi, and
Using Lemma 3, is decreasing in 5ri Vi, we can take 1/2 as an upper 
